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Abstract: 
Six years ago I asserted in print, with some sense of daring, that it was time to admit that the 
term mental retardation was a myth, a “false and unhelpful categorization of people with very 
diverse needs and characteristics” (Smith, 2002, p. 64). I quoted from Thomas Ssasz's (1960) 
classic work, The Myth of Mental Illness, and described the term mental retardation as being 
“scientifically worthless and socially harmful” (Ssasz, 1960, p. xi). I argued that the term should 
become an historical artifact of our evolving thought about children and adults with 
developmental disabilities. In my opinion, the millions of people who have been misunderstood 
and, sometimes, maligned by the term were deserving of a change in the manner in which they 
were regarded and treated. A disassembling of the aggregation of human conditions gathered 
under the term mental retardation might provide an opportunity to enhance our vision of who 
these people are as individuals and our understanding of their rightful places in our communities 
(Smith, 2002). 
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In taking this position, I was joining, of course, other voices who were calling for rethinking of 
the terminology of the field. Still, I thought that what I was saying was somewhat unique. I was 
wrong. 
 
Recently, while looking through bound volumes of one of the earliest professional journals in the 
field of intellectual disabilities, I came on an article published in 1967 that was humbling. In The 
Training School Bulletin I found an article written by George Brabner, Jr., with the engaging title 
of, you guessed it, “The Myth of Mental Retardation” (Brabner, 1967). In the article Brabner 
compared mental retardation with mental illness, saying that, “Retardation is about as useful a 
concept [to teachers and psychologists] as mental illness … [is] … to the psychiatrist and clinical 
psychologist” (Brabner, 1967, p. 151). 
 
Brabner argued that mental retardation was an omnibus term that covered a multitude of 
conditions. He stated that there were more than 100 causes of retardation or “whatever figure is 
currently in vogue” (Brabner, 1967, p. 150). Even so, Brabner observed, it “seems at times that 
some kind of unconscious wish to simplify some extraordinarily complicated aspects of human 
behavior is operant … [and] the label may serve to conceal more than it reveals” (p. 150). By the 
way, at my last count, there were nearly 400 causes of intellectual disability cited by the 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) (Luckasson et al, 
1992). 
 
Brabner (1967) then noted that there had been ingenious efforts to make the meaning of mental 
retardation as simple as seemingly possible by reducing its meaning to a disability caused by low 
intelligence. He challenged this conception, however, by saying that a 
 
Child's educational and social handicaps can no more be viewed as caused by low 
intelligence than can similar handicaps in a troubled gifted child be attributed to high 
intelligence … nearly every psychologist and teacher of the retarded is aware of the fact 
that two children may have identical IQs and yet one will be “diagnosed” as retarded and 
placed in a special class while the other will be placed in a regular grade. (Brabner, 1967, 
p. 150) 
 
While acknowledging that the 1961 American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD; now 
the AAIDD) definition had the “commendable feature of viewing low intelligence as ‘associated 
with’ but not causing impaired adaptive behavior,” he argued that the “relationship between 
subaverage general intellectual functioning and non-adaptive behavior is far from clear and that 
any ‘explanation’ of such behavior in terms of intellectual criterion is simplistic” (Brabner, 1967, 
p. 149). 
 
Brabner (1967) discussed the medical approach to classification that often starts with the 
grouping of diseases of unknown etiology into broad categories that are later refined as more is 
known of their origins, characteristics, and treatments. He emphasized that this refinement had 
not occurred in mental retardation, using the example of phenylketonuria (PKU). When 
identifying the condition, he said, 
 
They haven't identified a form of mental retardation; they have identified an inborn 
metabolic error that produces many symptoms only one of which is subaverage general 
intellectual functioning. But for us as educators and psychologists to lump individuals in 
the petrifying categories we impose is presumptuous, unrevealing, unhelpful and 
confusing. (Brabner, 1967, p. 152) 
 
Brabner's (1967) most important insight in the article, in my opinion, comes at the end of his 
observations on measures that would improve the general understanding and the provision of 
help to people in the disability category described as “mental retardation.” He explained that he 
was not necessarily calling for the abolition of “educational categories and classificatory 
systems, but instead [for a focus] … on the identification and remediation of the myriad learning 
deficits which in some cases disrupt, while in others merely detract from, maximal intellectual 
and social development in all children” (Brabner, 1967, p. 152). I feel that Brabner was calling 
for a change in thinking, not just a change in terminology in the field of intellectual disabilities. I 
think that he was saying that the first priority must be to change our concepts and behavior 
regarding the heterogeneity and diverse needs of the people who had been aggregated under the 
term. He said that the greatest problem of mental retardation came down to one assumption. 
“What is this assumption? Answer: that such an animal as mental retardation exists!” (Brabner, 
1967, p. 152). 
 
It has now been 41 years since George Brabner issued his call for change. As far as I can 
determine, little attention was paid to his concerns. In fairness, his article was published in a 
journal that, by the 1960s, was not one of the primary publications in the field. Still, his concerns 
were shared by others (see Blatt, 1987; Gelb, 1989). Brabner's call symbolizes for me, however, 
the difficulty that our discipline has encountered over the years in changing not only our words 
but our thinking about intellectual disabilities. 
 
I believe that the name change from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) 
to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities is a change for the 
good. Too much stigma had accumulated around the term mental retardation to allow for its 
continued use. If all that we change is the terminology, however, it seems to me likely that 
stigma will begin to accumulate around our new words almost immediately. We need to change 
our minds as well as our words. I believe that a conversation about the meaning of what we now 
call intellectual and developmental disabilities is crucial. Indeed, we must focus on the question 
of how to promote optimal opportunities and development in all of the children and adults 
encompassed by those terms. I believe that we must recognize that, although we may not be able 
to find commonalities in their medical, psychological, or educational characteristics, we can 
understand and communicate commonalities in terms of their need for individualized education, 
care, treatment, and social acceptance. 
 
For more than a decade, there has been controversy over the AAMR definitional changes in 
1992. There have also been calls for an “either/or” approach to mental retardation. A dichotomy 
was drawn between scientific study of retardation on one hand and advocacy and activism in the 
field on the other (Smith, 1999, p. 506). As we continue to adopt the terminology of intellectual 
and developmental disabilities, it is important that we see that there are important roles for both 
science and advocacy in our field. Although the scientific study of intellectual and 
developmental disabilities as a category may not be productive, the scientific study of specific 
disabilities under that rubric (e.g., Down syndrome or Williams syndrome) is possible and 
promising. Advocacy and efforts to increase public understanding of the meaning of the terms 
intellectual and developmental disabilities are critically needed. These functions of our 
professional organizations, and as our responsibilities as individual professionals, may allow us 
to increase our knowledge while preventing the accumulation of stigma around the new words 
we have chosen for ancient issues. Otherwise, we may be simply trading one myth for another. 
 
Dr. Brabner, I searched for you without success. If you are reading this, however, thank you for 
your insights. I am sorry I did not find your article earlier. Thank you also for the loan of your 
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